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ABSTRACT 
 
Political Violence and Unemployment: Socio-Economic Strain as a Potential Source of 
Terrorism 
 
Reinmar Freis-Beattie 
 
Why do some people commit acts of violence which are politically or ideologically 
motivated? Furthermore, why does the United States see such great variation in the number of 
terrorist incidents from year to year?  To help answer these questions, Robert Agnew’s (2010) 
General Strain Theory of Terrorism lays out a foundational model to explain what might cause 
terrorism. In contrast to previous strain theories, General Strain Theory of Terrorism argues that 
the strains most likely to result in terrorism are collective strains which are (a) high in 
magnitude, with civilians affected; (b) perceived as unjust; and (c) inflicted by more powerful 
‘others’. Collective strains affect groups or entire societies, rather than specific individuals. 
Collective strains increase negative emotions and attitudes, radicalize groups and individuals, 
contribute to a collective orientation and response, and facilitate the social learning of terrorism, 
while also reducing social control and access to legal coping means. 
To test this theory, I argue that economic strains constitute collective strains. From this 
point I tested a portion of GST, focusing my analysis within the US, and examining the conduit 
from economic strain to increasing negative emotions to domestic terrorism using a path analysis 
of macro-level data collected from public sources. The analysis showed moderate support for 
theoretical assumptions. Some macroeconomic indicators such as unemployment can lead to 
domestic terrorism, while others such as poverty do not. As unemployment in the US rises, so do 
negative emotions and attitudes, and through this, incidents of domestic terrorism. Of course, 
economic factors are only one possible source of strain, and negative emotions are only one 
mediator in Agnew’s model. From this we can conclude that General Strain Theory of Terrorism 
may be a worthwhile avenue for future research.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Although it started out like any other Wednesday, April 19, 1995 would soon become one 
of the most tragic days in American history. On that fateful day at 9:00am Central Time a 
massive explosion from a 4,800 pound bomb inside a Ryder truck ripped through the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and wounding almost 700 more 
(Sofer 2012). The explosion was so massive that it damaged buildings within a 16 block radius, 
and until the attacks of September 11
th
, 2001, was the most violent terrorist incident to ever 
strike US soil. The attacker, Timothy McVeigh, was a white supremacist who believed that the 
Federal government was attacking the civil liberties of people like him and that a race war was 
on the horizon. Oklahoma City was certainly the most dramatic event of domestic terrorism in 
the United States, but tragic events like this occur more often than we would care to admit, and 
there never seems to be a consensus as to the rhyme or reason. 
Every year, acts of violence occur in the United States which are distinct from traditional 
crimes. Acts of terrorism such as these are broadly defined as politically and socially motivated 
acts of violence which frequently target civilians or symbols of the US government. In recent 
decades, and especially since the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a hot-
button issue in world politics and the results affect our daily lives. Though catastrophic events 
such as 9/11 or the Oklahoma City bombing stand out most in the media, in reality terrorism is 
much closer than we realize, often occurring as small-scale events orchestrated and carried out 
by US citizens. The bigger terrorist threat to the United States comes from within, rather than 
from an external aggressor.  According to the FBI, between 1980-2001 about two-thirds of all 
terrorist plots were classified as “domestic”, and that figure rose to 95% between 2002 and 2005 
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(FBI 2005). Understanding and solving the social problems of terrorism and political violence 
has become a top priority of both governments and scholars. 
While the root causes of terrorism are controversially debated, one of the more popular ideas 
suggests that socio-economic strain may be a contributing factor. An unclassified Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) report from April 2009 predicted an increase in domestic terrorism 
citing the economic climate, high unemployment, mortgage foreclosures, and many returning 
military veterans as likely influences. This report draws many of its conclusions based on 
perceived similarities to the years leading up to the Oklahoma City bombing (DHS 2009).  
The goal of this research is to evaluate the validity of the relationship between economic 
strain and terrorism.  Some scholars conceptualize strain as pressure or stress exerted on an 
individual from an external force, which provoke individuals to engage in certain deviant 
behaviors (Agnew 1938). Robert Agnew (1992) described strain as “relationships where others 
are not treating the individual as he or she would like to be treated (p.48).” Within this definition, 
strain can be interpreted as an event, an interpretation of stimuli, and emotional responses. In 
terrorism research, strain is frequently used synonymously with ‘grievances’ (Agnew 2010). 
Economic strain is, therefore, strain or grievances which result from economic conditions or 
forces.  
Specifically, I examine this relationship under the framework of Agnew’s General Strain 
Theory of Terrorism (2010). Agnew’s theory focuses on how collective strains influence terrorist 
type behaviors, laying out the specific conditions or “paths” that lead to terrorism, such as 
radicalization, reduced social control, and increased negative emotions. Testing all the possible 
“paths” to terrorism is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I focus specifically on the role of 
negative emotions and attitudes and in connection to economic strains to subsequent terrorist 
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acts. I utilize data from the Global Terrorism Database, Stimson’s Public Mood Variable, 
Gallup’s Most Important Problem, the US Census Bureau, and Bureau of Labor Statistics to 
assess the validity of a path model connecting economic strain, negative emotion, and terrorism. 
Though many scholars have theorized about the possible causes of terrorism (Black 2004, 
Ehrlich and Liu 2002, Pape 2005, Sageman 2004, Schinkel 2009), currently there is little 
consensus among empirical studies evaluating the validity of theoretical work. Regarding the 
principles Robert Agnew’s theory, the literature is divided in its attempts to evaluate these ideas, 
with some studies finding a relationship, and others unable to reveal any significant connection 
between economic deprivation and terrorism. At minimum, this study will attempt to add to the 
current body of research, by empirically evaluating a specific theoretical perspective. 
On a more practical side, since terrorism and political violence are real-world problems 
taken seriously by policy makers, it is essential that the root causes are examined as closely as 
possible, as many anti-terrorism policies affect our daily lives. In the seemingly unending period 
of economic strain in which the US and much of the rest of the world is experiencing, it is also 
pertinent to evaluate whether or not we can predict if levels of politically motivated violence will 
rise. Since the onset of the economic recession in 2008, the political climate in the US has 
steadily become more polarized and hostile. As unemployment has risen so have tempers, and 
the more radical voices in our system have moved themselves to center stage (Przybyla 2011).  If 
the hypotheses presented in this research are correct, then policy makers should consider 
combatting economic strain to be of paramount importance in reducing and preventing political 
violence and terrorism within the United States. 
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THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
The terrorism literature is a huge body of both theoretical and empirical research which is 
growing rapidly. Searching Google Scholar for the word “terrorism” currently returns over 
700,000 academic sources. However, the current body of research is divided regarding the 
possible root causes of terrorism and politically motivated violence. In this section, I attempt to 
address some of the prevalent ideas and prominent studies upon which this research is built. 
Theories of Terrorism 
Explanations of terrorism are as wide reaching as the social sciences will allow. Perspectives 
from every discipline exist, whether psychological, political, economic, or sociological. Some of 
the prominent and relative perspectives are discussed below. 
An Identity Theory approach explaining religiously and ethnically motivated terrorism 
asserts that the interaction between cultural identity, social identity, and personal identity can be 
deterministic in whether an individual participates in terrorist activity (Schwartz, Dunkel, and 
Waterman, 2009). This approach focuses on terrorism more as a cultural phenomenon, namely 
when religious or ethnic groups such as Al Qaeda, the PLO, Chechen Rebels, and IRA engage in 
terrorist activities. However these ideas do not effectively explain cases of domestic terrorism in 
the United States. A similar, though more relevant theoretical approach, hypothesizes that group 
radicalization is a mechanism which can lead to terrorism (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). 
Under this pretense, terrorism is the outcome of a process of inter-group conflict. 
The logic of framing terrorism through rational choice has been argued by multiple authors 
(Caplan 2006; Turk 2004). The rational choice model argues that terrorism is not a haphazard or 
indiscriminate phenomenon, but rather one of many means to a social or political end, and with 
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potential risks and gains strategically calculated. In this framework terrorism is seen as a political 
act, used similarly to protests, voting behavior, and even warfare. 
However, other scholars feel that the rational choice model, used primarily by political 
scientists and economists, is too narrow and simplistic (Schinkel 2004). Instead, this counter-
argument posits that the social and historical context of terrorism is more important to 
understanding the problem. Rationalism in this sense is better defined through the group rather 
than the individual, where the group seeks to maximize the effect of limited resources for social 
or political gain (Schinkel 2004). Essentially, when these perspectives are taken together, 
terrorism is not a random act, but one that is employed to achieve a goal. Therefore it should be 
at least somewhat predictable. 
These perspectives are focused primarily on the choice of terrorism as a method to address 
grievances or accomplish a goal. Rather than evaluate the factors which shape the choice to 
employ one tactic over another, I instead seek to evaluate variables which shape the impetus of 
terrorism. What are the root causes which influence groups and individuals to become violent in 
the first place? To examine this aspect of terrorism, I turn to another school of thought that 
focuses on the role of structural variables and how such forces may “push” individuals and 
groups to turn to violence. This type of theoretical framework posits that political violence and 
terrorism in particular, are the result of broader socio-economic trends (Ehrlich and Liu 2002). 
Within this perspective, Social Strain Theory, which has its roots in Merton’s Anomie Theory 
(1938) and later updated by Agnew’s General Strain Theory (1992), offers an explanation of 
terrorism in the United States. 
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Social Strain Theories and Terrorism 
Originating in the structuralist perspective and continuing in the tradition of Durkheim 
(1895), strain theory approaches have traditionally been used by criminologists to explore the 
link between deviance and socio-economic disadvantage (Cohen 1965). The main principle in 
strain theory and its sub-theories is that structural, socio-economic factors put strain on 
individuals which “pushes” them into deviance (Merton 1938). Merton’s Anomie Theory 
focused on the influence of roles, class, and cultural factors along with structural conditions, on 
individual deviance. Merton theorized that failure to achieve specified social goals, such as the 
acquisition of material wealth and status, produces strain on individuals. In order to cope with 
strain, individuals use legitimate or illegitimate means to accomplish these social objectives, or 
abandon these goals, or both in five different coping strategies: conformity, innovation, ritualism, 
retreatism, and rebellion. 
Despite its popularity, Anomie Theory is not without its weaknesses. The primary 
shortcoming of the theory is that it focuses primarily on the acquisition of material wealth as the 
social goal.  This approach fails to explain non-utilitarian, ideological, or malicious crimes which 
do not result in material gain (Cohen 1997). To address the problems with Merton’s original 
idea, Agnew re-focused strain theory and asserted that strain could come from many places, 
focusing instead on norms, emotions, and the individual’s immediate social environment (1992). 
Agnew’s General Strain Theory differs from Merton in a few key ways.  Metron’s Anomie 
Theory focuses on macro-level forces, while Agnew’s theory focuses more on micro- level 
forces of social learning and immediate social environments. This refocusing and individualizing 
of strain from the macro- to micro-level is the primary contribution of General Strain Theory to 
the strain literature. In addition, Anomie Theory does not adequately address the role of emotion 
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in crime (Agnew 1992; Cohen 1965), which Agnew sought to rectify with General Strain 
Theory, arguing that structure and the social environment pressure individuals to commit deviant 
acts with emotions as their primary mediator (Agnew 1992). 
The same ideas about structure, strain, and social environment can be applied to terrorism, 
from the point of view that terrorism is a response to social and political grievances. The strain 
produced by structural and environmental factors pushes individuals and groups towards 
violence. These views have become popular enough that Agnew himself has proposed a 
“General Strain Theory of Terrorism” (GST) which offers a customized version of strain theory 
specifically for terrorism. The key difference between GST and other strain-based theories is that 
GST focuses on “collective strains”, whereas other approaches focus on strains as perceived by 
individuals (Agnew 2010). In other words, in previous theories strain was conceptualized as 
something that is felt only by individuals (Merton 1938; Agnew 1992), GST emphasizes strain as 
something felt by groups, and societies as a whole, in addition to the strain felt by individuals 
(Agnew 2010). This idea of collective experience of strain is central to how strain can translate 
into terrorism under the GST framework. With GST, these ideas of structure, social control, and 
social environment are applicable to both the micro- and macro-levels, and encompass a much 
broader scope than either Anomie Theory or General Strain Theory, while staying focused on a 
particular social phenomena. 
According to Agnew collective strains must be, “(a) high in magnitude, with civilians 
affected; (b) perceived as unjust; and (c) inflicted by significantly more powerful others, 
including ‘complicit’ civilians, with whom members of the strained collectivity have weak ties. 
(2010: 136)” He also argues that the likelihood of terrorism is amplified by these collective 
strains via increasing negative emotions, decreasing social control, diminishing ability to cope 
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through legal means, the cultivation of the social learning of terrorism, and a contribution to a 
collective emphasis and reaction. In other words, the link between the source of the collective 
strain and terrorism is not a direct one but, rather it follows one or more indirect paths. In this 
model, strain is transferred to groups and individuals via the various paths, similar to how a 
Newton’s cradle transfers energy across several spheres while only visibly affecting the ends. 
According to GST, terrorism can occur through any of the paths, however the likelihood of 
terrorism increases as multiple paths are engaged (Agnew 2010). 
Under Agnew’s model (2010), collective strains affect a group or entire society. As such, 
individuals experience the strain as it is diffused through the collective, meaning that although 
their lives may only be indirectly connected to or displaced by the strain, the effects are still felt 
as very real, even if only vicariously. Societal level strains still create a sense of fear, worry, 
anger, and frustration in individuals. For example, one must not become unemployed to be 
fearful, angry, or frustrated about a rise in unemployment. Seeing those around you experience 
strain, or hearing daily accounts of the effects of strain which exists on the collective level is 
enough to evoke these feelings in individuals.  
GST also postulates that not all strains are felt in the same way, and that very few people 
respond to strain with violence. Individuals and groups experience radicalization, increased 
negative emotions, and a collective emphasis and reaction. At the same time, collective strains 
reduce social control, reduce legal coping means, and facilitate the social learning of terrorism. 
This particular mix of forces is, according to Agnew, most likely to result in terrorism (2010). 
Figure 1 plots the various paths to terrorism from collective strain in Agnew’s GST model. 
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 Figure 1: Visual Conception of Agnew’s (2010) General Strain Theory of Terrorism 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Economic Conditions as Collective Strains 
In any empirical research, one of the biggest problems is translating abstract, theoretical 
concepts into concrete, operational variables that can be directly measured and tested. While the 
idea of collective strains is rather simple in itself, much of the work of operationalization has 
been left up to the researcher to define what constitutes a “collective strain.” In addition, the task 
of operationalization also involves asking which collective strains are likely to result in 
terrorism. Furthermore, as of the final draft of this paper, no previous research exists that 
empirically evaluates GST. This lack of previous research exacerbates the challenge of 
operationalization of the model’s key constructions but make the current research the first 
attempt to assess the validity and accuracy of Agnew’s GST model (2010). 
Collective 
Strain 
Radicalization 
Terrorism 
 
Increased Bad Emotions 
 
Reduced Social Control
Reduced Legal Coping Means 
Collective emphasis/ reaction 
 
Social Learning of Terrorism 
 
10 
 
 In this paper I argue that economic strains, specifically those resulting from macroeconomic 
forces, constitute collective strains as defined by Agnew’s criteria (2010). The economic 
atmosphere since 2008 is (a.) high in magnitude, affecting the entire country; (b.) perceived as 
unjust, especially with mass unemployment (Sanders, 2012); and (c.) inflicted by significantly 
more powerful “others”, such as the Federal Government and Wall Street as well as specific 
politicians and bankers who, arguably, have weak ties to the collective (Gibbs 2009). From this 
perspective, I assert that economic strain produced from structural forces such as a bad economy 
and high unemployment affect attitudes at the group and individual levels. Individuals and 
groups affected are then affected through one or more of Agnew’s “paths to terrorism” thereby 
increasing the likelihood of domestic political violence. 
Although this research is the first to investigate the relationship between economic variables 
and terrorism under Agnew’s GST framework, it is not the first to explore this connection 
between economic factors and terrorist acts. But these studies often yield contradictory results. 
Generally, studies of the relationship between economic variables and violence, including 
terrorism, use a frustration-aggression approach. Studies in this vein which focus on economic 
factors such as relative deprivation have been used to explain rebellions in the past (Gurr 1970). 
This approach, and others emphasizing the role of grievances, echoes many of the ideas found in 
the contemporary strain based approach to politically motivated violence. 
For instance, Weeber and Rodahever (2003) used a content analysis of US militia movement 
web forum posts to determine whether social or economic strain was a precipitating factor in 
their membership rates. Their findings support the principles of Smesler’s Theory of Collective 
Behavior, an earlier strain-based approach, and revealed that the majority of militia members 
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experienced socio-economic strain before or during their membership (Weeber and Rodeheaver 
2003). 
A study by Burgoon (2006) argues that social welfare policies reduce incidents of 
international and domestic terrorism. The research hypothesizes that social welfare policies 
diminish support for terrorism by reducing contributing factors such as poverty, inequality, 
economic insecurity, and religious-political extremism, and that countries with higher social 
welfare spending will experience fewer domestic terrorist attacks and fewer of their citizens 
participate in terrorism as a result of this decrease in socio-economic strain. These hypotheses 
were supported by a regression analysis that examined terrorism and social welfare spending on 
a global scale with the country as the unit of analysis (Burgoon, 2006). 
Another relevant article in support of the link between socio-economic factors and terrorism 
hypothesizes that countries with higher levels of minority discrimination will experience more 
incidents of domestic terrorism, and that more developed countries will experience lower levels 
of domestic terrorism (Piazza 2011). This study found that minority economic discrimination and 
general economic conditions were significant predictors of levels of domestic terrorism using a 
regression analysis (Piazza 2011). However, an earlier study by Piazza performed a cross-
national analysis, but did not reveal any relationship between economic indicators and terrorism 
(Piazza 2006).  
Another study using public opinion polls from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to analyze 
attitudes in support of terrorism did not find a reduction in support of terrorism among those with 
greater socio-economic resources (Krueger and Malekova, 2003). Krueger and Malekova (2003) 
also looked at Hezbollah’s terrorist activities in Lebanon during the 1980s and 90s. This analysis 
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did not reveal an empirical relationship between either economic factors or education and 
participation in terrorism. 
Clearly, there is some contention as to what role economic strain plays in influencing 
terrorism and how influential it is. My project seeks to add this small but important piece to the 
literature on terrorism and economic strain in two ways: (1), empirically evaluating a portion of 
GST and (2) addressing some of the limitations in previous empirical research. Many of the 
studies also examined terrorism on a global level rather than within a specific country, which I 
believe weakens their results by failing to account for differences in social, political, and 
economic factors which vary greatly between countries. It is possible that economics may be a 
more powerful force of stain in some societies and irrelevant to terrorism in others. Also, most of 
these studies do not examine data over time but merely look at a snapshot of terrorist data. Since 
terrorism is a highly dynamic phenomenon, with levels of violence varying greatly from year to 
year and between regions, I believe that an approach which accounts for changes over time is 
necessary to explain how dynamic social, political, and economic forces can affect terrorism. 
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METHODOLOGY 
In this study, I perform a limited test of Agnew’s GST model, focusing on how economic 
strains act as collective strains and affect negative emotions and attitudes, which in turn lead to 
acts of domestic terrorism. The rationale for this is twofold: First, as a relatively new theoretical 
model which is broad in scope, this paper takes a first step by evaluating GST by looking at a 
singular path to terrorism from collective strain. Second, a limited test will give an idea as to 
whether further and fuller tests of GST are worthwhile avenues to pursue with a larger. Since the 
theory is so broad, testing its individual parts is a logical first step.  
While economic strains constitute the collective strain portion of this model, a key aspect to 
the GST paradigm is the role of intervening or amplifying conditions that lead from collective 
strains to terrorism. For this research I explore the pathway through negative emotions such as 
fear, anger, and frustration to terrorism. Due to the emphasis of the broader strain theory 
literature on the importance of emotions (Agnew 1992, 2010), I feel that this is an appropriate 
place to start when testing GST. In addition, research into emotion and political collective action 
has found that anger, contempt, and efficacy play a large role in participation (Van Zomeren et 
al. 2004) in contentious behavior. At this point, not much research has closely examined the role 
of emotions in terrorism; however there is a clear case that this is a worthwhile avenue of inquiry 
(Rice 2009). It is also important to note that while this study focuses on the impact of 
macroeconomic forces, strain can originate from any number of sources, and GST is a theory 
about how people react to the strains which they experience (Agnew 2010). Figure 2 illustrates 
the relevant path of GST that will be examined here. 
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Figure 2: Assessed Path of Agnew’s (2010) General Strain Theory of Terrorism 
 
 
The theoretical pathway in Figure 2 translates into the following GST hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Increasing socio-economic strain will increase the level of negative 
emotions and attitudes in the United States. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Increasing negative emotions and attitudes will lead to increased rates of 
domestic terrorist attacks in the United States. 
 
Data and Measures 
This study utilizes secondary data analysis and examines data over time to evaluate the 
effect of dynamic change in socioeconomic factors on terrorist incidents. The unit of analysis is 
the nation-year, i.e. separate data for each variable organized by year (e.g. 1990, 1991, 1992, 
etc.). Since the root causes of terrorism and political violence have not yet proven to be 
generalizable across cultures, this model will have the most validity within the United States. 
Testing the relationship between economic strain, negative emotions and attitudes, and 
terrorism in the United States is not a simple undertaking. Firstly, both strain and negative 
emotions and attitudes are latent variables. They are not directly measured, but rather constructed 
from different proxy measures. Secondly, since the link between collective strain and terrorism is 
not direct, a regression analysis is not sufficient to test the relationship. This project will 
therefore use a path analysis, a more appropriate method for testing Agnew’s model. Primary 
Macroeconomic 
Strain 
Terrorism 
 
Negative Attitudes of 
Macroeconomics 
 
15 
 
hypotheses are derived from GST, and secondary hypotheses are derived from the individual 
measures used. 
Terrorism 
 Terrorism is a controversial issue, and each agency, think tank, and group of scholars has 
their own unique definitional criteria. These are mostly similar definitions which are all equally 
vague in their parameters. Debating this however, is not the purpose of this research. For the 
purpose of this study, I rely on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) definitional criteria for 
terrorism. It is a widely cited database, and considered by many to be the best source on 
terrorism in the United States.  
 The GTD defines terrorism as “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence 
by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation.” Within this blanket definition, the GTD also specifies that the act 
must be intentional, must involve some level of violence or threat of violence against persons or 
property, and that perpetrators must be sub-national actors (GTD Codebook). In addition, the 
GTD includes three criteria which can be required or not, allowing for researchers to specify the 
strictness of their definitions: 
1. The act must be aimed at pursuing political, economic, religious, or social goal. 
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some message to 
a larger audience than the immediate victims. 
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. 
For this research, data was collected requiring all three criteria to be met for inclusion, giving 
us the strictest possible definition within the dataset. Incidents can also be filtered on many 
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categories, such as geographic location, attack type, perpetrators, casualties, etc. and can be 
filtered on three specific definitional criteria, with unsuccessful attacks ambiguous cases either 
included or excluded. In addition, one further definitional criterion can be accounted for in the 
GTD: whether or not a sufficient doubt exists as to whether or not the event was exclusively 
terrorism. Many incidents of terrorism fall into a grey area with hate crime, insurgency, 
organized crime, and other crimes. This can be filtered out with the GTD’s “Doubt Terrorism 
Proper” filter in the advanced search. This was also required in this research to filter ambiguous 
cases. Unsuccessful attacks were included as well, since the purpose of the project is to assess 
the likelihood that individuals or groups will use terrorism, not how successful they are. 
This project also limits the number of terrorist incidents to those which fall into the 
classification of “Domestic” or “Homegrown” terror (Whitaker 2001), i.e. those committed by 
individuals who are US citizens either de jure or de facto. Definitional criteria for domestic or 
homegrown acts of terror were sourced from the FBI: “Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or 
threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within 
the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property 
to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in 
furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI 2005). Data was filtered to exclude incidents 
which did not meet either “domestic” or “homegrown” criteria. To be included in the analysis, 
groups must be based in the United States, and conduct their operations within the United States 
territory. Filtering was made on group affiliation, individuals and unknown perpetrators were 
included. A list of included and excluded groups is found in Appendix A.  
In my analysis, the actual measure of terrorism used as the dependent variable is the total 
number of terrorist incidents committed and attempted within the United States by year, filtered 
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using the aforementioned criteria. Recall that the goal is of course to assess the likelihood that 
individuals or groups turn to terrorism, not necessarily if they were successful. Once a count was 
made, years 1970 and 1971 were excluded as outliers, and 1993 is incomplete and counted as 
missing from the dataset, leaving 39 nation years for analysis. 
Independent Variables: Economic Strain 
My main independent variable of interest is economic strain, which I’ve chosen to 
measure with two indicators: unemployment rate, and poverty rate. I am primarily interested in 
the effect of the unemployment rate. Since unemployment is a highly dynamic force which rises 
and falls regularly, often translating into sudden shifts in socio-economic status for millions of 
individuals, I believe that it is most likely to create strain conditions which could result in 
terrorism. The unemployment rate is a measure of persons actively seeking gainful employment 
as a percentage of all workers in the United States. As defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
“Persons are classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in 
the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work. Persons who were not working and were 
waiting to be recalled to a job from which they had been temporarily laid off are also included as 
unemployed. Receiving benefits from the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program has no bearing 
on whether a person is classified as unemployed
1.” 
If socio-economic strain is a contributing factor to political violence, then unemployment 
should be a powerful predictor of terrorism in the United States. Unemployment is often a 
quickly changing force which has the potential to suddenly displace large numbers of people. 
Following from the frustration-aggression literature, these sudden drop offs in employment and 
                                                          
1
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2013. “Labor Force Characteristics.” US Department of Labor 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm#unemp 
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socioeconomic status are most likely to result in relative deprivation effects, which have shown 
to be a source of grievances in many political rebellions (Gurr 1970). This data was gathered 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which allows public access of unemployment data specified 
by month and year.  
 Information on the yearly poverty rate is freely available from the Census Bureau. The 
poverty rate is calculated as a percentage of the population living under the legally defined 
poverty line by income
2
. Poverty is a likely source of strain for individuals, and the poverty rate 
is a dynamic variable. As Nathaniel Hawthorne once said, “Families are always rising and falling 
in America.” Impoverished groups and individuals are likely to feel strains associated with their 
situations. 
Intervening Variables: Negative Emotions and Attitudes 
Agnew’s model also specifies the importance of intervening variables, or variables which 
amplify the various “paths” to terrorism as outlined in his theory. Agnew outlines several ways 
that strain can lead to terrorism, such as increasing bad emotions, radicalization, reduced social 
control, diminished legal coping means, the social learning of terrorism, and orienting a 
population to a collective response (Agnew 2010). While testing all of these paths would be 
ideal, it is beyond the scope of this project. Instead, I focus on one which is particularly 
interesting to social psychologists: how negative emotions can lead to terrorism in the presence 
of strain. Negative emotions are also a latent construct, and since there is no direct measure, I 
again use proxies to gauge the extent of negative attitudes and emotions, particularly as they 
relate to economic conditions in the United States. 
                                                          
2
 More information about poverty rate statistics is available from the US Census Bureau 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/ 
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The first measure is from the Public Mood dataset, compiled by James Stimson
3
. The 
dataset aggregates public opinion surveys from 1952 until 2011 on a number of different topics 
and subtopics. For this analysis, I isolate the measure of public mood regarding macroeconomics, 
which I feel is most appropriate for assessing the relationship between economic mood and 
strain. Questions asked in the macroeconomic topic areas are typically based on a Likert Scale of 
strongly agree to agree or disagree to strongly disagree and cover a range of economic issues. 
Some sample questions asked include: 
“Are you in favor of or against less government regulation of business?” 
“Are you in favor of or against government financing of projects to create new jobs?” 
“The government ought to see to it that every person who wants work has a job. Agree or 
disagree?” 
“Do you feel rich people are asked to pay more than they should in federal income taxes, about 
the right amount, or less than they should?” 
“I the government had to choose between keeping down inflation or keeping down 
unemployment, to which do you think it should give the highest priority?” 
 
Public mood is measured on a scale of 1-100, with higher numbers associated with more 
liberalism, i.e. desire for more government involvement, openness to more spending (Stimson 
2012). While this is a roundabout proxy measure, based on evidence from psychological 
research, we can expect that lower values or more conservative moods are associated with more 
negative emotions  such as more resistance to change, and more extreme response to threats than 
higher or more liberalistic moods (Jost and Amodio 2011; Thorisdottir et al. 2007). 
The second intervening variable used is Gallup’s Most Important Problem, a collection 
of public opinion polls which assess the topic areas which are most important to Americans. The 
                                                          
3
 More information on Public Mood Data available from the Policy Agendas Project  
http://www.policyagendas.org/ 
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topic areas in the surveys are based on the topic areas used in the Public Moods dataset, and 
assess what percentage of people think that a given topic is the most important problem at the 
time. Once again, we used the Macroeconomic topic for our analysis. It is reasonable to think 
that when more people feel that macroeconomics is the most important problem that they 
experience more negative emotions, such as worry, fear, or anger, in relation to that topic. This 
variable is recorded as the percentage of respondents who feel that macroeconomic issues are the 
most important and pressing problems of the day. 
Operationalized Hypotheses 
Now that the dependent, independent, and intervening variables have been 
operationalized to measure terrorism, collective (economic) strain, and negative emotions and 
attitudes, respectively, I restate my hypotheses using these specific variables: 
Hypothesis 1a: As the unemployment rate increases, macroeconomic public mood will decrease 
(i.e. become more negative). 
Hypothesis 1b: As the unemployment rate increases, the percentage of Americans that view 
macroeconomics as the most important problem will increase. 
Hypothesis 1c: As the poverty rate increases, macroeconomic public mood will decrease (i.e. 
become more negative). 
Hypothesis 1d: As the poverty rate increases, the percentage of Americans that view 
macroeconomics as the most important problem will increase. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: As macroeconomic public mood decreases (i.e. becomes more negative), the 
number of domestic terrorist attacks will increase. 
Hypothesis 2b: As the percentage of Americans who view macroeconomic issues as the most 
important problem increases, the number of domestic terrorist attacks will increase. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 lists basic descriptive information for the dependent, independent, and 
intervening variables used in the analysis. Figures 4 through 6 plot the change in the variables 
over the time period under analysis in this research (1972-2011, omitting 1993). From 1972 to 
2011, the United States experienced an average of 32.5 incidents of domestic terrorism, with the 
largest year experiencing 112 incidents, and the lowest experiencing only 1. Looking at 
economic indicators, unemployment averages 6.93% over the same period, ranging from 4.0% to 
9.7%, the poverty rate has an average of 13.1%, with a range of 11.1% to 15.2%. As far as 
emotions and attitude measures go, Public Mood averages a score of 59.08, ranging from 51.9 to 
66.9, and Macroeconomics as the Most Important Problem has an average of 38.62%, ranging 
between 11.45% and 78.78% from 1972 to 2011. Looking at the variables graphed over time, we 
can see that they are dynamic phenomenon which can fluctuate greatly over time. Some do so 
more than others, for instance, terrorism and Most Important Problem have a large range of 
values, while unemployment, poverty, and public mood have more moderate variation. 
Terrorism peaks in the 1970s and 1980s, and has steadily declined from the late 1990s to the 
present. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Terrorism 32.53 24.52 1 112 
Unemployment 6.39 1.57 4.0 9.7 
Poverty 13.1 1.23 11.1 15.2 
Public Mood 59.08 3.78 51.9 66.9 
Most Important Problem 38.62 16.98 11.45 78.78 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Domestic Terrorist Incidents in the US 
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Figure 4. Economic Strain Variables 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Emotions and Attitudes Variables 
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RESULTS 
Testing the relationship between economic strain, negative emotions and attitudes, and 
terrorism in the United States is not a simple undertaking. First, both strain and negative attitudes 
are latent variables. They are not directly measured, but rather constructed from different proxy 
measures. Second, since the link between collective strains and terrorism is not direct, a standard 
regression analysis is not sufficient to test the relationship. My analyses will therefore use path 
analysis, a more appropriate method for testing Agnew’s model. Path analysis allows for 
sequential “paths” from variable to variable, mimicking the structure of the GST model in Figure 
1, and the proposed path under assessment here, as previously outlined in Figure 2. 
First, I examine the bivariate correlation coefficients between variables, displayed in 
Table 2 below. As we can see, unemployment is not correlated with Public Mood at -0.003, but 
has a very strong correlation with Most Important Problem at 0.819. Poverty exhibits low 
correlation with Public Mood at 0.197 and low-moderate correlation with Most Important 
Problem at 0.364. Then, Public Mood has a moderate correlation with terrorism at -0.536, while 
Most Important Problem has low-moderate correlation with terrorism at 0.377. These 
relationships are expended upon in a path analysis. 
Table 2. Bivariate Correlation Coefficients 
 Dependent Variable 
Mood Problem Terror 
Independent Variable    
Unemployment -0.003 0.819  
Poverty 0.197 0.364  
Public Mood   -0.536 
Most Important Problem   0.377 
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The results of the path analysis on the link between economic strain, negative emotions, 
and terrorist incidents are presented in Table 3. As expected, unemployment and most important 
problem have a significant, positive relationship. As unemployment rises, more people consider 
macroeconomics to be the most important problem. This supports Hypothesis 1b. In contrast, 
Hypothesis 1d is not supported. While the predicted relationship between poverty and the most 
important problem variable was positive, the path analysis finds a negative, but statistically 
significant relationship. Essentially, as the poverty rate increases, the percentage of Americans 
who view macroeconomic issues as the most important issue decreases, which is the opposite of 
what was theoretically predicted. Macroeconomic public mood is not affected by changes in 
unemployment, though it is significantly affected by changes in the poverty rate. However, the 
positive relationship suggests that as poverty rises, public moods towards macroeconomic factors 
become more liberalistic, meaning that negative emotions and attitudes actually decline. These 
relationships for the public mood variable do not support either Hypothesis 1a or Hypothesis 1c. 
In the second stage of the path analysis, we see that macroeconomic mood is a significant 
predictor of terrorism in the United States. Specifically, as macroeconomic public mood 
decreases- meaning emotions become more negative - incidents of terrorism increase. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 2a. However, the coefficients for poverty → mood and mood → 
terrorism go in opposite directions. Most important problem is also statistically significant when 
predicting terrorism, though the significance level is not as powerful as mood. Here we can see 
that there is some suggestion that when macroeconomic factors become more important, that 
terrorism increases. This supports Hypothesis 2b. Figure 7 visually represents the significant 
paths from table 3. 
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Table 3 – Path Analysis (One-Tailed Hypotheses) 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 Problem Mood Terror 
Independent Variables    
Poverty 
-4.73*** 
(1.56) 
1.06* 
(.49)  
Unemployment 
11.22*** 
(1.19) 
-.59 
(.64)  
Problem 
  
.30* 
(.20) 
Mood 
  
-2.96*** 
(.91) 
    
R2 .73 .07 .28 
Overall R2  .75 
Notes: *p<0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p<0.01 
N = 39 
       
 
Figure 6. Path Analysis Model 
 
 
 
Unemployment 
Poverty Macroeconomics Most 
Important Problem 
Macroeconomic 
Public Mood 
Terrorism 
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Ancillary Analyses 
An ancillary analysis re-evaluated the path analysis to account for alternate models. First, 
the path analysis was tested without the Public Mood variable, as shown in Table 4. The results 
showed strong support for Hypothesis 1b, meaning that as unemployment increases, the 
percentage of Americans who view macroeconomics as the most important problem increases. 
Similarly to the first analysis, Hypothesis 1d was not supported, and even suggests the opposite: 
that as the poverty rate increases, the number of Americans who view macroeconomics as the 
most important problem decreases. Hypothesis 2b was more strongly supported in this analysis 
than in the initial estimation. As the number of Americans who view macroeconomics as the 
most important problem increases, the number of terrorist incidents increases. 
 
Table 4. Path Analysis Excluding Public Mood (One-Tailed Hypotheses) 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
Problem Terror 
Independent Variables   
Poverty -4.73*** 
(1.56)  
Unemployment 11.22*** 
(1.19)  
Problem 
 
.30*** 
(.20) 
   
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
N = 39 
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Due to the still existent confusion of the relationship between poverty, most important 
problem, and terrorism, a third analysis was done using path analysis, but excluding poverty and 
Public Mood as shown in Table 5. This analysis showed the strongest relationship between 
strain, emotions and attitudes, and terrorism. As unemployment increases, the percentage of 
Americans who view macroeconomics as the most important problem increases, and as this 
increases, so do incidents of domestic terrorism in the United States. This supports Hypotheses 
1b and 2b, and the larger theoretical hypothesis much more strongly than previous analyses. Note 
that the statistical significance levels for ancillary analyses have dramatically increased as well. 
 
Table 5. Path Analysis Excluding Public Mood and Poverty (One-Tailed Hypotheses) 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
Problem Terror 
Independent Variables   
Unemployment 8.83*** 
(.997)  
Problem 
 
.539*** 
(.212) 
   
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
N = 39 
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A final analysis was performed without any intervening variables and tested economic 
strain against terrorism using a regression analysis, shown in Table 6. The results showed that 
even without mediators, a statistically significant relationship exists. Unemployment has a strong 
positive relationship with terrorism, meaning that as unemployment rises, so do incidents of 
domestic terrorism. Similarly to previous models though, poverty has a strong negative 
relationship with terrorism in the US. This is the opposite of what was theoretically predicted. 
The results of this regression show only moderate support for the economic strain-based 
explanation. 
 
Table 6. Regression Analysis without Intervening Variables (One-Tailed Hypotheses) 
Variable 
Unemployment 10.97*** 
(3.89) 
Poverty -16.15*** 
(4.65) 
Constant 173.29*** 
(42.65) 
R
2 
 .394 
 
Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
N = 39 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This research set out to empirically evaluate a relatively new theoretical perspective, Robert 
Agnew’s General Strain Theory of Terrorism, and to offer a possible explanation of varying 
levels of political violence in the United States. GST postulates that collective strains are likely 
to result in terrorism through various causal “paths” such as increasing negative emotions, 
radicalization, fostering the social learning of terrorism, reducing social control and legitimate 
coping means, and creating a collective orientation and response. I then argue that economic 
strains act as collective strains, and perform an initial test this model through increasing negative 
emotions and attitudes, and examining how they may result in domestic terrorism.  
To do this, I performed a secondary data analysis of nation-years in the United States. Data 
was collected on macroeconomic indicators from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and on emotions and attitudes towards macroeconomic issues from the public moods 
dataset and Gallup’s most important problem survey. Terrorism data was collected from the 
Global Terrorism database, and filtered to include only incidents that were considered domestic 
terrorism without significant doubt. 
A path analysis was performed which found some support for the theoretical model. 
Unemployment was a significant predictor of macroeconomics as the most important problem, 
but not public mood. Poverty was a significant predictor of public mood and most important 
problem, however in the opposite direction of what was expected. Public mood and most 
important problem were both significant predictors of the number of terrorist incidents in the 
United States, meaning that as emotions and attitudes regarding macroeconomics become more 
negative, terrorist incidents increase. 
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I draw two conclusions from the path analysis results. First: that there is some support of 
Agnew’s GST model, particularly the path from strain through negative emotions to terrorism, 
even though the relationships tested are far from perfect. Second: that there are a number of 
problems and limitations that may muddle the results. Some of the relationships are actually the 
opposite of what was expected theoretically, further confusing the results. The small sample size 
may be obscuring potentially significant relationships, which can be improved by simply 
conducting another analysis in the future when more datapoints are available. This analysis also 
focuses on macro-level factors, and does not account for situational factors, which may be 
instrumental in pushing groups and individuals from strain to terrorism. 
In addition to this, there may be problems with the latent variables not completely or 
accurately capturing what they are being used to measure. The terrorism variable itself has some 
issues, namely possible collection problems and changes in criteria. Using data which has been 
synthesized from multiple collection periods carries this risk. Data collected consistently from 
the same researchers or organization with the same criteria may yield different results. There are 
also other ways of measuring terrorism rather than focusing on base number of attacks. Instead, 
future research could focus on other quantifiable measures such as amount of damage done, 
number of casualties, and other measures of the ‘quality’ of terrorism.  
It is also possible that negative emotions and attitudes are not being accurately captured. A 
more direct measure of public emotional state which focuses less on policy issues and more on 
satisfaction versus frustration and anger would possibly yield different results. The Public Mood 
variable in particular leaves a big question as to how much ‘emotion’ is actually being measured 
versus simply left/right leanings. Furthermore, the relationship between poverty, public mood, 
and terrorism is the opposite of what is theoretically predicted. It of course makes sense when we 
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step back and see that increases in poverty are associated with more liberal attitudes towards 
government involvement in economics, including taxes and social welfare. It is likely that there 
is very little in terms of emotion which is represented in this variable. Its predictive power may 
in fact be reflecting political attitudes more closely associated with a US-specific type of 
terrorism, specifically right-wing extremism. Essentially, when the mood is more conservative, 
right-wing extremists are more likely to view the government as their enemy, while other 
ideologies may not move to this line of thought. These same political cleavages are unlikely to 
be predictive of terrorism in other cultures. 
Based on this analysis, we can conclude that quick, dramatic changes in macro-economic 
forces such as unemployment may produce the type of strain which may result in terrorism. This 
is easily related back to both the broader strain theory literature, as well as the frustration-
aggression and relative deprivation hypotheses. A sudden increase in unemployment can 
potentially displace millions of workers who were previously well off. This change may be seen 
as more unjust, and inflicted by powerful others, and more likely to increase feelings of fear, 
anger, frustration, and resentment among the collective. These feelings are what Agnew (1992; 
2010) argues influences people to turn to deviance and violence. 
Poverty increases do not appear to result in terrorism, which is largely consistent with 
other research evaluating this relationship (Piazza 2006). We can conjecture that poverty is not a 
dramatic enough change to result in the types of strains which may cause terrorism. Poverty, 
unlike unemployment tends to be more of a long-term state. It is absolute deprivation, and 
objective strain, rather than relative deprivation and subjective strain which is associated more 
with deviance, crime, rebellion, and terrorism (Gurr 1970, Agnew 1992, Agnew 2010).  
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Ancillary analyses largely confirm the earlier conclusions of results and limitations. The 
same Hypotheses were supported, and made stronger with the removal of Public Mood and 
Poverty, two variables with clear problems in the previous analyses. What this shows is that 
poverty is not likely a root cause of terrorism in the United States, while unemployment may be. 
This makes sense when we think about the concepts: poverty is a much more static phenomenon, 
and individuals typically experience poverty as part of a life course. Poverty is much more of a 
social reality than unemployment, which represents a dynamic change in socio-economic status 
and creates much more turmoil in the social environment. 
One more interesting point can be conjectured from the descriptive statistics alone, that the 
overall trend in terrorist incidents has been downward since the 1980s. This is similar to all 
violent crime in the US. According to the GTD the past decade has been comparatively low in 
terms of number of terrorist incidents. This leaves us with another question, of whether this trend 
is the result of post 9/11 policies being effective at deterring violence, part of broader trends of 
decreasing violence in the United States, or the result of some other, unmeasured factors. It is 
possible that law enforcement and intelligence agencies have gotten better at stopping terrorist 
plots before they come to fruition, therefore lowering the count of incidents. It is also possible 
that the ‘quality’ of terrorist tactics has improved, so that instead of many ‘low quality’ attacks, a 
group only needs one or two ‘high quality’ attacks in order to accomplish their goals. This would 
also lower the overall number of incidents. In addition, looking to the broader criminology 
literature may provide more possible explanations which could help explain this long-term trend. 
The results of this study are not strong enough to definitively confirm or refute the principles 
of General Stain Theory of Terrorism, and should be taken for what they are: a limited test of 
part of a larger theoretical framework. What we can say from this analysis is that economic 
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strains are likely one of many factors which influence terrorism in the United States, and that 
increasing negative emotions is only one possible path which can lead us there. At the end of the 
day, this study is not about material gain or macroeconomics, but rather how individuals and 
groups deal with strain and stressors. This very may well be the case with a more rigorous 
analysis, or it could be headed in the wrong direction. One thing is certain though, more testing is 
needed before this theoretical approach can be accepted or refuted.  
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Appendix A – Terrorist Groups 
 
Included Groups Excluded Groups 
American Indian Movement  Al-Qa`ida  
Americans for a Competent Federal Judicial 
System  
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)  
Americans for Justice  Anti Shah of Iran  
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)  Anti-Castro Command  
Animal Rights Activists  Anti-Castro Group  
Anti-Abortion Activists  Arabs (suspected)  
Anti-Environmentalist  Armenian Group  
Anti-Government Group  Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia  
Armed Revolutionary Independence 
Movement (MIRA) (suspected)  
Armenians  
Army of God  Black September  
Aryan Nation  Cali Narcotics Cartel 
Black American Moslems  Croatian Freedom Fighters  
Black Brigade (United States)  Croatian Liberation Army  
Black Liberation Army  Croatian Nationalists  
Black Muslims  Cuban Action  
Black Panthers  Cuban C-4 Movement  
Boricua Revolutionary Front  Cuban Exiles  
Chicano Liberation Front  Cuban Secret Army  
Chicano Radicals (suspected)  Cypriot  
Christian Liberation Army (suspected)  Hanafi Muslims  
Coalition to Save the Preserves (CSP) 
(suspected)  
Imperial Iranian Patriotic Organization  
Condor  Iranians (suspected)  
Continental Revolutionary Army  Irish Republican Army (IRA)  
Covenant, Sword and the Arm of the Lord 
(CSA)  
Islamist Extremists  
Earth First!  Jamaat-al-Fuqra  
Earth Liberation Front (ELF)  Justice Commandos for the Armenian 
Genocide  
Earth Liberation Front (ELF),Revenge of the 
Trees  
Kahane Chai (suspected)  
Earth Night Action Group  Latin America Anti-Communist Army 
(LAACA)  
East Side Action Committee  Lebanese Man  
Environmental Life Force  Libyan Students  
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Environmentalist  Luis Boitel Commandos  
Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International 
Conspiracy (EMETIC)  
Maccabee Squad and the Shield of David  
Farm Animal Revenge Militia (FARM)  Macoute sympathizers  
Fourth Reich Skinheads  Medellin Drug Cartel 
Fred Hampton Unit of the People's Forces  Mexican Revolutionary Movement  
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional 
(FALN)  
Movement for Cuban Justice (Pragmatistas)  
Gay Liberation Front  Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)  
George Jackson Brigade  National Front for the Liberation of Cuba 
(FLNC)  
Independent Armed Revolutionary 
Commandos (CRIA)  
National Integration Front (FIN)  
Individual  Ninth of June Organzation  
International Committee Against Nazism 
(suspected),Jewish Action Movement 
(suspected)  
Omega-7  
Jewish Armed Resistance  Organization Alliance of Cuban Intransigence  
Jewish Committee of Concern  Otpor  
Jewish Defenders (suspected)  Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
(suspected) 
Jewish Defense League (JDL)  Palestinians  
Jewish Direct Action (suspected)  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP)  
Jewish Extremists  Revolutionary Commandos of the People 
(CRP)  
Ku Klux Klan  Secret Cuban Government  
Left-Wing Militants  Serbian Nationalists  
May 19 Communist Order  Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)  
Mormon Extremist  Tontons Macoutes  
National Socialist Liberation Front  Vietnamese Organization to Exterminate 
Communists and Restore the Nation 
(suspected)  
Neo-Nazi Group  Vietnamese Refugees  
New Jewish Defense League  Worldwide Organization of Native Taiwanese  
New World Liberation Front (NWLF)  Young Cuba  
Nuclear Liberation Front (suspected)   
Organization 544   
Peoples' Brigade For A Healthy Genetic Future  
People's Liberation Army (United States)   
Phineas Priesthood   
Posse Comitatus   
Puerto Rican Armed Resistance   
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Puerto Rican Nationalists (suspected)   
Puerto Rican Revolutionary Movement   
Red Guerilla Family   
Republic of New Afrika   
Republic of Texas   
Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade  
Save Our Israel Land   
Secret Army Organization   
Secret Organization Zero   
Sons of the Gestapo   
Student Radicals   
The Jewish Execution with Silence   
The Justice Department   
The Order (Silent Brotherhood)   
The Order II (Bruder Schweigen Strike Force II)  
The Scorpion   
Thunder of Zion   
Tribal Thumb   
United Freedom Front (UFF)   
United Jewish Underground   
Universal Proutist Revolutionary Federation  
Unknown   
Up the IRS, Inc   
Weather Underground, Weathermen   
White Extremists   
Youths of the Star   
Zebra killers   
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Appendix B – Dataset 
 
Year Terror Unemployment Poverty Public Mood Most Important Problem 
1972 46 5.6 11.9 62.357 24.1135 
1973 35 4.9 11.1 58.153 38.6482 
1974 54 5.6 11.2 58.138 56.3478 
1975 112 8.5 12.3 56.805 59.6859 
1976 94 7.7 11.8 57.159 55.5344 
1977 98 7.1 11.6 55.417 45.3159 
1978 49 6.1 11.4 54.864 59.9662 
1979 41 5.9 11.7 53.07 50.7661 
1980 37 7.2 13 52.978 56.3124 
1981 34 7.6 14 51.888 69.208 
1982 46 9.7 15 52.796 78.7798 
1983 30 9.6 15.2 54.425 61.2119 
1984 49 7.5 14.4 56.575 52.7975 
1985 29 7.2 14 56.755 44.8276 
1986 26 7 13.6 59.937 37.4468 
1987 22 6.2 13.4 59.114 31.3726 
1988 14 5.5 13 60.69 33 
1989 23 5.3 12.8 60.455 23.4375 
1990 19 5.6 13.5 58.848 32.2539 
1991 18 6.9 14.2 59.473 40.1276 
1992 24 7.5 14.8 60.698 50.5342 
1993 . 6.9 15.1 61.72 46.0902 
1994 38 6.1 14.5 58.326 22.4404 
1995 45 5.6 13.8 59.652 29.7101 
1996 33 5.4 13.7 58.064 31.6416 
1997 35 4.9 13.3 59.198 21.2364 
1998 20 4.5 12.7 57.518 16.8942 
1999 39 4.2 11.9 57.187 11.4541 
2000 22 4 11.3 56.638 13.814 
2001 33 4.7 11.7 56.513 21.9932 
2002 13 5.8 12.1 58.969 25.1848 
2003 29 6 12.5 63.991 33.5164 
2004 8 5.5 12.7 63.357 27.6278 
2005 16 5.1 12.6 63.738 19.2051 
2006 5 4.6 12.3 62.403 15.1111 
2007 9 4.6 12.5 62.592 13.587 
2008 9 5.8 13.2 63.387 39.7258 
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2009 1 9.3 14.3 66.854 52.6982 
2010 7 9.6 15.1 66.543 48.0118 
2011 7 8.9 15 66.035 53.2516 
 
